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Abstract 
In a recent paper (Harris & Epton, 2009) we reviewed the evidence showing that self-
affirming – the act of reflecting upon cherished values or attributes – can reduce 
resistance to health-risk information. In this companion paper we extend the 
discussion of issues arising from that review and describe key questions for future 
research. Overall, we regard the picture emerging from this nascent literature as 
encouraging. Nevertheless, more needs to be discovered about how self-affirming 
achieves its effects and their limits. Despite lowering an important barrier to health 
behaviour change by reducing message resistance, there is currently only limited 
evidence that self-affirming changes subsequent health behaviour. We consider why. 
We also discuss issues to address in interventions involving self-affirmation and 
examine evidence that self-affirming alters relationships between variables. There is 
also scope for extending the range of samples, health information, and health 
behaviours examined and for assessing more spontaneous self-affirmation.  
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Most people prefer information that supports rather than challenges their important 
beliefs. This preference has been shown for beliefs of many kinds (Sherman & Cohen, 
2006). In the case of health beliefs, a preference for congenial information may lead 
people to reject potentially vital information by, for example, downplaying the 
importance of messages about health risks, or prompting them to regard such 
information as personally irrelevant. Consequently, those for whom the information is 
most relevant may be the least persuaded about the long-term dangers of their lifestyle 
and the need to change their behaviour (Good & Abraham, 2007).  
There is evidence that self-affirming – the act of reflecting upon one’s important 
values or cherished attributes – can reduce such resistance to uncongenial 
information, including resistance to unwelcome but important health-risk information 
(Harris & Epton, 2009). Self-affirming can promote greater acceptance of health-risk 
information and reduce message derogation in the target audience; self-affirmed 
participants often also show greater interest subsequently in changing their health 
behaviour. In this paper we consider some of the issues arising from the previous 
review and the questions we think are in need of further examination. In preparing it, 
we have assumed readers are familiar with its companion (Harris & Epton, 2009). 
Self-Affirmation Theory 
Self-affirming is the process of reflecting upon one’s cherished values, actions or 
attributes. It functions to restore or maintain a person’s sense of who they are and 
what they stand for when they experience threats to their identity. The theory 
proposes that people are strongly motivated to maintain their sense of being rational, 
decent, sensible people (encapsulated in the theory as their sense of “self-integrity”, 
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Steele, 1988, p. 262). So, when they feel their self-integrity is threatened they take 
steps to protect it.  
From this perspective, one reason why people resist messages warning them about 
risks they are taking with their future health is that such warnings threaten their self-
integrity. Resistance  – “a motivated state in which the goal is to withstand the effects 
of a persuasive communication” (Jacks & O’Brien, 2004, p. 236) – is one strategy that 
preserves self-integrity; if the message can be undermined and rejected, then it poses 
no threat. However, intriguingly, self-affirming has the potential also to reduce such 
“defensive” resistance to threat. Self-affirmation theory proposes that people are 
motivated to maintain their overall or global sense of self-integrity. Consequently, a 
separate reminder of something self-affirming – even something completely 
unconnected to the threat – can be sufficient to buffer against that threat. Thus, self-
affirming can promote more objective appraisal of otherwise threatening information. 
For example, recalling recent occasions in which you acted in accordance with an 
important value (e.g., kindness or honesty) can bolster self-integrity; so, if shortly 
afterwards you face a message about the risks of continuing to smoke, you feel able to 
process that message with a more open mind (because you are no longer so concerned 
that it will damage your self-integrity). 
This prediction – that self-affirming can promote more objective appraisal of 
otherwise threatening information – has been tested (and found to be very largely 
supported) in the literature reviewed by Harris and Epton (2009). In a typical 
experiment participants are required to self-affirm (e.g., by writing about an important 
value) before being asked to examine relevant health-risk information (e.g., about the 
risks of excess alcohol consumption). Their responses to this information (e.g., on 
The impact of self-affirmation p.5 
 
 5 
measures of message acceptance, affect, and intentions; see Harris & Epton, Table 1) 
are then compared with those of a control group. 
Some Benefits of the Self-Affirmation Theory Approach 
It is important to understand resistance to health-risk information for both theoretical 
and practical reasons. Theoretically, we need to improve our understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying resistance. Practically, resistance represents an important 
barrier to health behaviour change; if people do not accept that a message is relevant 
to them, they are less likely to attempt to change their behaviour (Weinstein 1988).  
Research on self-affirmation has the potential to contribute to both theoretical and 
practical understanding. Self-affirmation theory emphasises the role of the self-system 
in understanding why people are resistant to unwelcome information. This enhances 
existing perspectives on resistance to health-risk information, which tend to 
emphasise physical threats rather than threats to the self (though see Das, de Wit, & 
Stroebe, 2003, for an exception). Self-affirmation theory also suggests a number of 
relatively simple ways of reducing message resistance that may have potential for 
development as applied techniques for use in interventions; interventions that are 
easily implemented are in great demand. Moreover, though there may be problems in 
using self-affirmation manipulations in applied settings – as we discuss later – they 
have one major advantage over most alternatives: they do not require changes to 
persuasive materials. Instead, it is proposed, self-affirming changes the way people 
approach and respond to information, rendering them more open-minded and 
prepared to accept strong and persuasive information telling them things they would 
prefer were not true. As well as practical advantages – it allows existing materials and 
information to be used – this also has ethical advantages, as it is not a technique for 
increasing persuasion. Instead, self-affirming affords more objective appraisal of 
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existing information – allowing it to “speak for itself” – and therefore potentially 
contributes to more genuinely informed decision-making. That is, self-affirmation 
reduces message resistance, but whether that results in message acceptance depends 
on the quality of the information.  
How does self-affirming reduce resistance to relevant health-risk information? 
The principal evidence that self-affirmation reduces resistance to health-risk 
information is that it typically increases message acceptance in at-risk groups (Harris 
& Epton, 2009). However, there are limitations to the existing studies that mean many 
questions concerning the boundaries of the effects, as well as about the processes 
involved, remain unanswered. Below we consider some of the questions we think it 
would be useful to address in the next phase of research.  
It would be helpful to know more about where in the stages of message processing 
self-affirmation makes a difference and how it affects the strategies people use to 
resist persuasion (Jacks & Cameron, 2003). For example, Blumberg (2000) describes 
four defensive coping strategies that people use to resist: attention avoidance 
(indiscriminately avoiding all relevant messages), blunting (avoiding the threatening 
elements of the message), suppression (trying not to think about or elaborate on the 
self-relevance of the information), and counter-argumentation (biased assessment and 
active refutation of elements of the message). Frameworks such as this could be used 
to establish where self-affirmation begins to change people’s cognitive and affective 
response to threatening health-risk information and whether and how it shapes those 
responses at different stages. There is some evidence that self-affirming may reduce 
blunting. For example, in Klein and Harris (2009) self-affirmation enhanced 
attentional bias towards threatening words taken from the message in at-risk 
participants. Similarly, in Van Koningsbruggen, Das and Roskos-Ewoldsen (2009) 
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self-affirmation increased the accessibility of threat-related cognitions in the target 
audience.  
Does self-affirming reduce attention avoidance? Studies to date have required that 
participants expose themselves to the threat, so we cannot tell. Indeed, apart from one 
early study (Reed & Aspinwall, 1998), no study has allowed participants to navigate 
their own way through the information. What happens when people are free to 
structure their own passage through material or allowed to avoid parts of it? Do at-
risk, self-affirmed participants differ in how they search for and select material on the 
Internet, for example? The Internet contains information that both threatens and 
reassures and there is evidence that people may be more naturally drawn to the latter 
(Dutta-Bergman, 2004; Joinson & Banyard, 2003; Sillence, Briggs, Harris & 
Fishwick, 2007); it would be reasonable to predict that self-affirmation changes this in 
favour of more balanced data-gathering, but this has yet to be tested. 
Does self-affirming reduce suppression or counter-argumentation in response to 
health-risk information? Little systematic attention has been paid to these questions. 
Indeed, little attention has been paid so far to process questions in this literature 
(Harris & Epton, 2009). While self-affirming is hypothesised to promote greater 
open-mindedness, does this typically result in more or less thoughtful processing? 
Does it alter processing goal (Chaiken, Gina-Sorolla, & Chen, 1996)? Self-affirmation 
has been shown to increase sensitivity to argument strength in non-health domains 
(Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004), suggesting it does result in more central route 
(thoughtful) processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). However, self-affirming before a 
persuasive message appears also to boost judgmental confidence; where the message 
is low in threat, such confidence leads to less thoughtful message processing (Brinol, 
Petty, Gallardo & DeMarree, 2007). There is considerable scope for research 
The impact of self-affirmation p.8 
 
 8 
investigating when and in what ways self-affirming affects the processing of health-
risk information and people’s thoughts about their thought processes (or meta-
cognitive judgments), such as judgmental confidence.  
When and how does self-affirming moderate the affective response to health-risk 
information? Surprisingly few studies have examined these questions, especially 
given the central role that negative affect, such as fear, is believed to play in both 
threat minimisation and message responsiveness (e.g., Witte & Allen, 2000). 
Likewise, few studies have tested how self-affirming affects self-related affect. Where 
studies have examined affective responses, few have used implicit measures of affect, 
even though some theoretical explanations of the effects of self-affirmation rely on 
implicit mood as a mediator (e.g., Tesser, 2000). There is also a need for further tests 
of the intriguing idea that self-affirming promotes open-mindedness by enhancing 
other-directed positive emotions, such as love (Crocker, Niiya & Mischkowski, 
2008).  
In choosing dependent measures, more explicit attention might usefully be paid to 
the literature on how to identify and measure threat minimisation, defensiveness and 
responsiveness. For example, following their meta-analysis, Good and Abraham 
(2007) suggested that message acceptance, perceived severity and susceptibility are 
reliable measures of defensiveness, but also that some measures (e.g., perceived 
susceptibility) appear less sensitive to self-affirmation manipulations than others (e.g., 
message agreement). Which measures are included, therefore, may influence what is 
found. In turn, Rothman and Salovey (2007) point to the need for multiple indicators 
that assess responsiveness to the information as well as threat minimisation, as these 
may occur in parallel (Leventhal, 1970). Self-affirming appears to promote 
responsiveness over minimisation in at-risk groups, and thus to alter the balance 
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between them (Harris & Epton, 2009). We need to understand more about the 
implications of changing this balance, such as its consequences for successful health 
behaviour change. This is a key issue to explore in future research.  
In testing how self-affirming affects responses to health-risk information 
researchers could use more diverse samples and types of information. In particular, 
the literature would benefit from testing how self-affirming affects responding in 
samples with genuine health issues, such as those coping with chronic conditions. 
Health-risk information also comes in many forms other than the one-sided, verbal, 
non-tailored, persuasive messages that currently predominate. Even within the 
persuasive message paradigm there is scope to broaden the focus from health 
compromising behaviours (like smoking) to health-promoting behaviours (such as 
taking exercise) and from preventive to detection behaviours (such as screening for 
disease). Indeed, there is a disjunction between the self-affirmation literature and that 
on defensiveness to health information, which has explored detection behaviours in 
some detail (e.g., Croyle, Sun, & Hart, 1997). Detection behaviours are perceived as 
riskier and respond better to loss-framed appeals (Rothman & Salovey, 2007). In 
extending the range of behaviours targeted researchers might test whether framing 
moderates the effects of self-affirming, particularly as a function of behaviour type. 
For example, it may be that self-affirmed participants are less sensitive to the framing 
of an outcome as a loss or a gain than their non-affirmed counterparts. 
Messages have also tended to target health threats that are both temporally remote 
and statistically unlikely for the samples of young people involved: investigating 
more proximal health issues in such samples would be useful. Moreover, with only a 
few notable exceptions (Epton & Harris, 2008; Fry & Prentice-Dunn, 2005) relatively 
little attention appears to have been paid to the structure and content of the message, 
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which could be developed using more theory-based approaches (e.g., Maibach & 
Parrott, 1995; Witte, Meyer & Martell, 2001).   
Self-affirmation induced open-mindedness 
What happens to people when they self-affirm and why does this make them more 
open-minded? In Harris and Epton (2009) we discussed possible mediators, including 
several that show promise, such as boosts to self-certainty and to other-directed 
feelings; However, currently there is no generally accepted mediator. 
More broadly, Sherman and Hartson (in press) have recently proposed a three-
stage model of how self-affirmation promotes more open-minded appraisal of 
unwelcome information. According to this model, self-affirming boosts self-
resources, defined as those “objects, personal characteristics, conditions, or energies 
that are valued by the individual or that serve as a means for attainment of these 
objects, personal characteristics, and energies” (Hobfoll, 1989, p. 516). This boost to 
self-resources gives people the energy and scope to confront the threat rather than 
rationalising it. In particular, having self-affirmed they feel more secure in their self-
worth and thus less concerned about its self-evaluative implications. Indeed, 
according to Sherman and Hartson, self-affirmation actually “uncouples” the threat 
from the self so that the threatened domain no longer contributes as much, if at all, to 
self-evaluation. Recent findings are consistent with this model. For example, 
Schmeichel and Vohs (2009) have shown that self-affirmation counteracts the effects 
of depleted self-regulatory resources and improves self-control by promoting higher 
levels of mental construal (see also Wakslak & Trope, 2009). 
Although Sherman and Hartson are careful to point out that they do not presume 
that their model describes the process underlying all self-affirmation effects, it 
provides a compelling synthesis of the current literature. In part derived from the 
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literature on self-affirmation and health-risk information, it may provide a useful 
framework for future analyses of how self-affirming affects health risk processing. 
Nevertheless, much remains to be discovered about the processes by which self-
affirmation enables people to become more open-minded about information 
describing threats to their health and the limitations on these positive effects. 
Moderators of the effects of self-affirming on responsiveness to health-risk 
information 
Several important leads have emerged about the boundaries of the positive effects of 
self-affirming on responsiveness to relevant health-risk information. Other possible 
moderators have been suggested but await empirical scrutiny.   
Findings to date suggest that self-affirming not only appears to reduce message 
resistance among more at-risk groups, but that the effects can be most pronounced in 
these groups (Harris & Epton, 2009). However, Van Koningsbruggen (2009) has 
argued that the benefits are limited to moderate threat levels and that self-affirming 
promotes less rather than more objectivity when threat is high or low. This claim is 
obviously of both theoretical and applied importance but awaits empirical scrutiny. In 
Klein and Harris (2009) changes in attentional bias after self-affirming were indeed 
limited to moderately heavy drinkers, but self-affirming at higher risk levels did not 
induce bias away from threat. Indeed, self-affirming has been hypothesised or found 
to have its biggest effects (e.g., Harris & Napper, 2005), no effects (e.g., Klein & 
Harris, 2009) or rebound effects (e.g., van Koningsbruggen, 2009) on resistance at 
high risk. Clearly, there is scope here for research to clarify what should be found 
when and why.  
At the other end of the continuum, people at low levels of risk should experience 
little or no self-threat on exposure to the information. Under such circumstances, 
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boosts to self-integrity may have unpredictable or even detrimental effects. For 
example, Brinol et al. (2007) showed that self-affirming before receiving a non-
threatening message (not about health) reduced thoughtful message processing. We 
need to know more about the consequences of self-affirming among those at low risk 
and the processes involved.  
Most studies reviewed by Harris and Epton used value affirmations, so the 
obtained positive effects on health cognition and motivation may be limited to or most 
pronounced for value affirmations. However, Jessop, Simmonds and Sparks (2009) 
recently examined differences between kindness, trait, and value affirmations. While 
all three promoted less defensiveness, only the traits condition promoted more 
requests for a sample of sunscreen than the control. Value- and esteem-based self-
affirmations may, therefore, produce different effects (see also Schmeichel & 
Martens, 2005; Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009). If other-related affect (such as love and 
connectedness) is a key mediator of the effects of self-affirming, then there will also 
be differences between value-affirmations in their ability to promote open-
mindedness if they vary in capacity to induce such affect. Self-affirmation theory 
currently treats these as different means to the same end (self-integrity bolstering or 
restoration), so exploring this issue may have important implications for the theory. 
The benefits of group affirmations rather than self-affirmations (e.g., Derks, van Laar 
& Ellemers, 2009) for health also offer an interesting avenue for exploration.  
With only one exception (Sherman et al., 2000, study 1) the studies reviewed by 
Harris and Epton (2009) tested the effects of self-affirming before rather than after 
threat. Whether order affects the impact of self-affirming on outcomes is an open 
question. For example, McQueen and Klein (2006) concluded that the order of 
presentation is not important to the positive effects of self-affirming, partly because of 
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short time intervals between delivery of the self-threat and the self-affirmation 
manipulation and also the immediacy of measurement of the dependent variables in 
most experiments. Consistent with this, in Sherman et al. (2000, study 1) self-
affirmation produced equivalent positive benefits on message acceptance and 
intentions to those found in studies where the self-affirmation preceded the threat. 
However, order will clearly affect the processes involved and different mediators are 
probably responsible when self-affirmation prevents or repairs harm (McQueen & 
Klein, 2006). It may be that self-affirming after exposure to the message promotes 
reconsideration of the arguments (Sherman et al., 2000), affects the extent to which 
the individual relies on recall of thoughts generated while reading the message (Brinol 
et al., 2007), or the extent to which he or she employs deductive rather than inductive 
reasoning (Klein, Blier, & Janze, 2001). Moreover, delay between the self-affirmation 
and threat (whether before or after) may be critical. For instance, Critcher, Armor and 
Dunning (in press) have recently shown that, if a person has time to respond 
defensively to a threat, self-affirming is no longer able to reduce that defensive 
response.  
This raises interesting questions about when and how self-affirmation undoes 
established defensive responses. Studies in the health domain have shown that self-
affirming can undo defensiveness even among respondents with presumably well-
established repertoires of defensive responses, such as cigarette smokers (Armitage, 
Harris, Napper, & Hepton, 2008; Harris, Mayle, Mabbott, & Napper, 2007). 
However, Sherman and Cohen (2006) have proposed that self-affirming may be less 
effective where chronically activated dissonance-arousing behaviours have led people 
to develop defensive repertoires, such as in heavier groups of smokers or drinkers. 
This is another good reason to expose groups of more chronic and perhaps older users 
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to self-affirmation manipulations. It also means that, in testing the moderating role of 
threat, researchers need to disentangle empirically the level of threat from chronic 
dissonance activation, perhaps by using experimentally manipulated rather than 
measured threats.  
Other proposed moderators have yet to receive much if any attention in the 
literature on health-risk information. Sherman and colleagues have recently 
demonstrated that awareness of the consequences of self-affirming may be 
detrimental to its effectiveness. Both those who are naturally more aware of the likely 
effects of being self-affirmed and those who were explicitly told about them exhibited 
weaker effects in a series of studies (Sherman et al., 2009). Likewise, affirming within 
the same domain as the threat tends to be counter-productive, perhaps because it 
promotes confidence and feelings of impunity (Sherman & Cohen, 2006).  
Self-affirming is also likely to affect some types of people more than others. 
Intriguingly, the most researched individual difference moderator in the broader self-
affirmation literature, trait self-esteem, has received relatively little attention in the 
literature on health-related self-affirmation. There may be a difference in moderation 
by trait self-esteem as a function of whether self-affirming is spontaneous or 
manipulated (see, e.g., Boney-McCoy, Gibbons & Gerrard, 1999). Other individual 
differences associated with positive self regard and health-related information 
processing, such as dispositional optimism (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1994), self-
certainty (Wright, 2001), threat orientation (Thompson, Schlehofer & Bovin, 2006), 
regulatory focus (Higgins, 1998), preference for consistency (Cialdini, Trost, & 
Newson, 1995), need for closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), consideration of 
future consequences (Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994) and 
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behavioural approach/avoidance (Carver & White, 1994), are obvious potential 
moderators worth exploring.  
Finally, some of these moderators (e.g., awareness of the consequences of self-
affirming or affirming within the same domain as the threat) may be especially 
important in determining the effectiveness of self-affirmation based interventions. We 
consider this later. 
Self-affirmation and health-behaviour change 
In reducing resistance to health-risk information self-affirmation removes an early 
obstacle to health behaviour change. However, while self-affirmed participants often 
subsequently express stronger intentions to change behaviour – and may even engage 
in more behaviours, such as leaflet taking or condom purchasing, consistent with 
these intentions – there is currently only limited evidence that they subsequently 
change their health behaviour (Harris & Epton, 2009).  
Why is that? On the one hand, it could reflect the difficulties of trying to change 
behaviours, especially ones satisfying important personal or social needs. On the other 
hand, it could indicate problems with the motivation induced by self-affirming. These 
possibilities – which clearly have very different theoretical and practical implications 
– form the focus of the next few sections.  
Does self-affirming produce greater readiness to change? 
Researchers investigating whether self-affirmation induces greater interest in health 
behaviour change have borrowed their lead from the dominant paradigm in health 
psychology, which emphasises deliberative processes and pinpoints the development 
of sufficient readiness or intention to perform the new behaviour as pivotal (Conner & 
Norman, 2005). But how does self-affirmation affect intentions? While it is a 
relatively straightforward task to derive predictions from self-affirmation theory about 
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how self-affirmed people should respond to a potentially threatening message, as we 
move to testing the effects of self-affirming on more distal variables, such as 
intentions, the bases for predicting effects of self-affirming become less clear.  
The most straightforward model in terms of its assumptions is the one that seems 
to be implicit in much of the research to date. This assumes that self-affirming 
promotes acceptance of a strong message but it is the message that promotes greater 
readiness to change behaviour. If so, the effects of self-affirming on intentions should 
be mediated by the changes that occur among self-affirmed participants on predictors 
of intentions following exposure to the information.  
One problem with this model is that currently there is more evidence for positive 
effects of self-affirming on intentions than on predictors of intentions; however, 
measurement of the critical variables has been patchy (Harris & Epton, 2009). Ideally 
researchers should test the post-message effects of self-affirming on variables derived 
explicitly from one or more models of health behaviour. There is, after all, no 
shortage of relevant models from which to choose (see Conner & Norman, 2005). 
Indeed, one model proposes that bias in response to a threatening health message 
leads to both underestimation of the threat and overestimation of the efficacy of the 
recommended action (Das et al., 2003). Research to date has focussed considerably 
more on the effects of self-affirming on the former than the latter bias.  
A second problem is that few researchers have tested for mediation. Where they 
have, however, there is some evidence to support the model. For example, among 
smokers in Armitage et al. (2008), message acceptance mediated the impact of self-
affirmation on intentions to quit smoking and intentions, in turn, mediated the effect 
of acceptance on leaflet taking (significantly more self-affirmed than non-affirmed 
smokers took leaflets on how to quit). In van Koningsbruggen and Das (2009) 
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message derogation mediated the effect of self-affirming on intentions (of higher risk 
participants) to take an online diabetes test and intentions mediated the effects of self-
affirming on the behaviour (clicking the link to the test) particularly among those at 
higher risk. In Epton and Harris (2008) response-efficacy mediated the effects of self-
affirmation on subsequent behaviour.  
There have also been failures to find mediation, but these are harder to interpret. 
In Epton and Harris (2008) self-efficacy did not mediate the effects of self-affirmation 
on subsequent behaviour, perhaps because of ceiling effects. In Jessop et al. (2009) 
measures of acceptance and defensiveness did not mediate the positive effect of self-
affirming on taking a sample of sunscreen; however, in the above model acceptance 
should mediate intentions rather than behaviour. In Harris and Napper (2005) risk 
perceptions did not mediate the impact of self-affirmation on intentions; however, 
relationships between risk judgments and intentions are complex (Weinstein & 
Nicolich, 1993).  
Because the path from acceptance to intentions uses established predictors of 
intentions, this model has the benefit of combining the self-affirmation literature with 
existing social cognition models of behaviour (e.g., the EPPM, Witte, 1992; the 
Theory of Planned Behavior, Ajzen, 1991) and we propose it as the default model for 
testing. Researchers should explicitly test this model and explore experimental as well 
as more traditional methods of assessing mediation (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). 
Indeed, as well as the obvious benefits to theoretical integration and development, 
attention to models and theories also serves to clarify predictions. For example, not 
only does open-minded appraisal not inevitably result in message acceptance (it only 
does so if the information is persuasive), acceptance does not inevitably result in 
intentions to change; it does so when efficacy as well as threat is high (Witte, 1992). 
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Without such models researchers run the risk of expecting effects the models would 
not predict. 
Of course, there may be other paths through which self-affirming influences 
behaviour. For example, self-affirming may induce stronger intentions to change 
without concomitant changes on the usual predictors, which may be why there is 
more evidence for main effects of self-affirming on intentions than on predictors. 
More generally, in addressing the “downstream” effects of self-affirmation there is a 
need to disentangle (both theoretically and empirically) those effects of the 
manipulation on predictors and outcomes mediated by the message from those that 
are direct effects of self-affirming. There is also evidence that self-affirming alters 
relationships between variables (see later), so it may change how the predictors relate 
to intentions. Indeed, in Harris et al. (2007) self-affirming reduced the relationship 
between threat and intention; it would be useful to assess whether it moderates the 
relationship between intention and other predictors of intentions (and the 
consequences of this for behaviour).  
Moreover, researchers are uncovering evidence of the distinctive processes 
involved in the successful translation of intentions into behaviour (Schwarzer, 1992; 
Sheeran, Milne, Webb & Gollwitzer, 2005) and beyond into maintenance and habit 
(Rothman & Salovey, 2007). Attention needs to be paid to the potential impact of 
self-affirming at all phases, not just intention formation and action initiation.  
Finally, behaviour is impulsive as well as rational. There is considerable scope for 
exploring whether and in what ways self-affirming affects more impulsive behaviour 
(e.g., Hofmann, Friese & Wiers, 2008). 
So, why is there only limited evidence to date about effects on behaviour? 
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Of course, from the applied perspective the big question mark over self-affirmation 
concerns its potential for inducing health-behaviour change. Despite one recent 
success (Epton & Harris, 2008), most published studies testing for effects of self-
affirming on health behaviour have found none, even though self-affirming has been 
shown to change important behaviours in non-health domains (Cohen, Garcia, Purdie-
Vaughns, Apfel, & Brzustoski, 2009).  
Epton and Harris (2008) discuss some reasons for this. The studies reporting 
failures have involved attempts to reduce or terminate health-compromising 
behaviours, such as alcohol or cigarette consumption, that require a range of 
physiological, lifestyle and social adjustments that complicate the process of health 
behaviour change; so the type of behaviour being targeted may moderate the 
effectiveness with which self-affirming promotes behaviour change. Health-
promoting behaviours, such as improving diet or increasing exercise, may make more 
responsive targets (Epton & Harris, 2008). Moreover, the studies were not 
interventions, but experiments with brief manipulations, usually in laboratory settings, 
and in most the behavioural goal was vague and the message lacked information 
about how to achieve it. The time scale for following up the behaviour may also have 
been insufficient – the longest has been one month (Harris & Napper, 2005). Given 
this, it is perhaps less surprising that these studies failed to find effects on their 
targeted behaviours, despite positive changes in intentions in the self-affirmed group 
(e.g., Harris & Napper, 2005).  
On the other hand, it may be that there are problems with the intentions formed by 
self-affirmed participants. Possibly they are too weak or unstable to sustain 
subsequent behaviour, perhaps because they are induced by heightened 
responsiveness to experimental demand or undue optimism. The strength and stability 
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of intentions are important determinants of subsequent behaviour change (Cooke & 
Sheeran, 2004). Indeed, if self-affirming changes how intentions are formed, this may 
affect such key properties of these intentions and in the process their chances of being 
translated into effective action. This may be one reason why there is limited evidence 
for effects of self-affirming on behaviour.  
In fact, self-affirming could even prove counter-productive to health behaviour 
change: It may, for example, prompt premature attempts to change – perhaps because 
of ill conceived intentions, inflated perceptions of ability to enact the behaviour or 
barrier underestimation – that result in subsequent failure and demoralisation. Much 
more research attention needs to be paid to these possibilities. 
However, even when self-affirming results in strong, stable and well-formed 
intentions, we should not expect them to translate inevitably into successful attempts 
at health behaviour change; common sense, as well as decades of research, tell us that 
there can be a gap between even the best of intentions and behaviour (Sheeran, et al., 
2005). There are currently no theoretical grounds for expecting the intentions formed 
after self-affirming to be any better able to overcome this intention-behaviour gap 
than those formed otherwise.  
Currently, therefore, we have no clear basis on which to establish if self-
affirmation has rarely promoted health behaviour change because of the difficulties of 
trying to change the targeted behaviours or because of deficiencies in the motivation it 
induces. This is a key question to tackle in future research. 
Using self-affirmation in interventions 
Nevertheless, researchers may be encouraged to press ahead with intervention studies 
by the promising effects of self-affirmation on resistance and motivation. In doing so 
they should, of course, take note of the above issues and also the limitations of the 
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existing studies, which have been mainly laboratory based, used samples with high 
literacy and intelligence, and manipulations involving essay writing or values scales 
that have to be administered individually. 
How to get people to self-affirm is clearer in some applied contexts – such as 
those involving individual counselling or small-scale group work in controlled 
settings (see, e.g., Charlson et al., 2007) – than in others. In particular, it is not yet 
clear how self-affirmation might be used in mass communications. There have been 
some attempts to incorporate self-affirmation manipulations into warnings and 
leaflets, but these have met with mixed success: the attempt by Dillard, McCaul, and 
Magnan (2005) was unsuccessful, but in Jessop et al. (2009) the relevant (positive 
traits) condition successfully promoted requests for a free sample of sunscreen.  
There are also other issues that pose potential problems for interventions 
involving self-affirmation. McQueen and Klein (2006) point out that applications will 
need less convoluted cover stories, but what if the intervention signals to the recipient 
the purpose of self-affirming, given that such awareness appears to eliminate the 
benefits (Sherman et al., 2009)? Indeed, Sherman and Hartson (in press) go so far as 
to suggest that the “key to an effective affirmation intervention may lie in the subtlety 
of its delivery and the minimalism of its administration” (p. 34). Outside the 
laboratory it may be natural for people to focus on characteristics and attributes 
related conceptually to the targeted domain, yet same-domain affirmations typically 
backfire (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). What happens to low threat participants exposed 
to the message? Earlier we discussed the possibility that there may be unpredictable 
or even deleterious consequences for such participants, such as unwarranted boosts to 
judgmental confidence. There are also data (Harris & Napper, 2005) showing that 
self-affirming can lead to reductions in risk perceptions for threats not targeted in the 
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message, suggesting potentially detrimental effects on unrelated events even among 
high-threat participants. Self-affirmed participants also sometimes employ less 
effective reasoning strategies, such as when testing the validity of an hypothesis 
(Munro & Stansbury, 2009). 
Researchers committed to intervening nonetheless, might consider whether self-
affirming should be bolstered by techniques known to enhance the translation of 
intentions into behaviour, such as the formation of implementation intentions 
(Sheeran et al., 2005). It may also be useful to bolster the initial self-affirmation 
subsequently (see, e.g., Cohen, et al., 2009). 
The experimental paradigm 
So far the published research on the health implications of self-affirming has been 
exclusively experimental. While this brings many benefits, it has to date created two 
lacunae in the evidence base. First, it has led to a relative failure to examine whether 
self-affirming affects the relationships between variables (McQueen & Klein, 2006). 
Second, there has been little or no exploration of spontaneous rather than forced self-
affirmation.  
Relationships between variables 
There is some evidence that self-affirming may change the relationships between 
variables. For example, in Sherman et al. (2000, study 1) the more the message 
evoked positive than negative thoughts, the more self-affirmed (but not non-affirmed) 
participants accepted it. Among self-affirmed participants in van Koningsbruggen and 
Das (2009), diabetes risk was positively related to intentions to take the online 
diabetes test and unrelated to message derogation; in contrast, in non-affirmed 
participants, it was unrelated to intentions and positively related to message 
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derogation. In Harris et al. (2007) self-affirming reduced the relationship between 
threat and intention.  
Indeed, one implication of the idea that self-affirming uncouples the threat from 
the self (Sherman & Hartson, in press) is that there should be weaker correlations 
between measures of self-evaluation and measures related to the threatened domain in 
self-affirmed conditions. Sherman and Hartson describe several examples where this 
is the case. For example, in Sherman et al. (2009) ratings of information criticising a 
controversial baseball player (Barry Bonds) were negatively correlated with ratings of 
identification with his team (the San Francisco Giants) among non-affirmed but not 
among self-affirmed Giants fans. If Sherman and Hartson are right, self-affirming 
should similarly attenuate relationships in the health domain where ratings in the non-
affirmed condition are determined primarily by defensiveness.  
Klein and colleagues have also proposed that self-affirming changes the basis on 
which people make judgments when threatened, rendering them more deductive (i.e., 
less data-driven). For example, Klein et al. (2001) examined the relationship between 
risk judgments (for heart disease and alcohol poisoning) made two months apart in a 
group of high school students. On the second occasion, participants were either self-
affirmed or not and either received or did not receive challenging information (in the 
form of the group mean for each risk factor from time 1). Klein et al. found that self-
affirmed participants, when threatened, paid less attention to their behaviour in 
making their judgments; for example, time 1 risk factor ratings significantly and 
strongly predicted time 2 risk factor ratings in all groups except self-
affirmed/threatened participants. More recently, Klein and Monin (2009, p. 382) 
report data showing that self-affirming reduced the positive relationship between 
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reported alcohol consumption and perceptions of breast cancer risk (in data collected 
but not reported by Klein & Harris, 2009).  
Although both sets of ideas suggest that self-affirming should attenuate certain 
relationships, the protagonists view the consequences quite differently. Sherman and 
Hartson see this as one of the ways in which self-affirming reduces defensiveness; 
Klein, on the other hand, suggests that more deductive judgments can be more 
defensive (e.g., Klein et al., 2001). Currently, it is not clear how these differences are 
to be resolved. Indeed, downplaying personal relevance or susceptibility is thought to 
be a common defensive strategy. This should result in a weakened relationship 
between risk assessments and personal judgments among at-risk, non-affirmed 
participants, so that one effect of self-affirming should be to improve the 
correspondence between risk assessments and personal judgments .Yet where 
researchers have examined this issue, it appears the opposite is the case.  
Clearly, self-affirming has the potential to change relationships between variables. 
More studies should examine this aspect of their data and the possibility that self-
affirming changes the basis on which judgments are made. It would also be useful to 
know how stable any such effects are. Above all, we need to clarify theoretically 
where, when and why self-affirming changes relationships. 
Spontaneous self-affirmation 
The research reviewed so far requires participants to self-affirm. Very little empirical 
work has examined spontaneous self-affirmation. In the health domain there is some 
related research on compensatory self-enhancement (CSE), a defensive response to 
threatening information that involves coping by focusing on positive personal 
qualities; CSE has been shown to be associated with more, rather than less, defensive 
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responding to the health threat, at least in high self-esteem participants (e.g., Boney-
McCoy et al., 1999).   
There is much to discover about whether, when and how people self-affirm in 
their everyday lives and the consequences of doing so, both in general and in relation 
to health-threats. In this respect the data lag considerably behind the theoretical 
analyses – including that originally offered by Steele (1988). Sherman and colleagues 
(e.g., Sherman & Cohen, 2006) suggest that in everyday life effective self-affirmation 
– the sort that helps people confront threats – may operate with subtlety and without 
conscious intent, setting it apart from the conscious and deliberate strategies often 
encouraged for those low in self-regard. This is an intriguing possibility that awaits 
empirical scrutiny. It also remains to be seen to what extent people spontaneously 
self-affirm pre-emptively in the way encouraged by the manipulation, rather than 
reactively in the way typically described in accounts of Self-Affirmation Theory (e.g., 
Steele, 1988). 
In conclusion 
While we regard the picture emerging from this nascent literature as encouraging, 
more needs to be discovered about how self-affirming achieves its effects and their 
limits. We hope the material and issues covered in this review will assist researchers 
in developing the studies that will contribute to the next phase of the research and, in 
conjunction with Harris and Epton (2009), provide those who simply wish to know 
more about the topic with the information they need. 
Health messages are powerful, often containing information about threats to life; 
most people are highly involved with their health and many approach health-risk 
information with experience in resisting elements of the message or with scepticism 
about health messages more generally. These features set health-risk information 
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apart from some of the other topics used in research on persuasion. We suggest it 
provides particularly fertile territory in which to investigate the effects of self-
affirmation, develop its theoretical base and test its applied implications.  
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